After two decades of development, the human capital investment model has been thoroughly incorporated into the language and thinking of labor economists and is central to most analyses of earnings determination. The principal innovation of this development is the focus on earning capacity and human wealth; incomes over time are determined by individuals' choices of investment patterns and by competitive returns on past investments. By this theory, individuals make a series of compensating choices (presumed to be rationally based); these investment choices imply that lifetime labor earnings will be more equally distributed than cross-sectional labor incomes. If such is the case, considerable caution is required in comparing cross-sectional earnings for individuals at different career points or across race and sex groupings.
schooling, job search, geographic mobility, preventive medicine, even recreation. In this paper, we concentrate on one activity, post-school OJT, because of its perceived dominance in life-cycle wage determination. Human capital investment models vary considerably in both theoretical and empirical specifications. In this section, we extend the "Mincer" version of OJT investment behavior to accommodate intermittant and varying employment patterns and more generalized investment behavior. This is placed within an estimation context which concentrates upon the structural investment parameters.
1.1. Conceptual Model. The kernal of the human capital theory of individual earnings is the relationship between investment, productive capacity, and wage rates over the life-cycle. This analysis concentrates exclusively on generalized models of post-school investments in skill acquisition made on-the-job. (The subsequent empirical analysis considers schooling investments only to the extent that they interact with OJT investments).
The potential earning capacity in period t, Jti, of individual i (that is, earning capacity if it did not include any training) can be written as where Hi is the accumulated stock of human capital, Xi is a vector of other observable, capital augmenting characteristics, i1i is a composite of unobserved or unobservable characteristics, and the subscript t indicates years since entry into the labor force. With homogeneity among workers except for human capital stocks, a static competitive market implies (1') Wt= rHt where r is the competitive rate of return to the stock of capital. Earning capacity is taken here to be synonymous with wage rates. This specification clearly limits attention only to "general" worker-financed human capital; cf. Becker [1964] . Human capital that is specific to an individual firm (i.e., nontradable) is ignored, even though such training might have implications for an individual's wages within the given firm. (See, for example, Chapman and Tan [1980] ). The human capital stock, with no depreciation, is merely the accumulated flow of past investments. If all investment after leaving school at z =0 comes in the form of on-the-job training,2 then (2) Hi ikif Wi where 2i is the fraction of total time in period T spent on the job and ki is the fraction of potential earning capacity devoted to OJT investments. This formulation incorporates explicitly the idea that the amount of on-the-job training must be related to the amount of time spent on-the-job. Further, if workers finance training investments through reductions in wages (cf. Becker [1964] or Mincer [1974] ), the observed wage, Wi, is:
W= -k i i
Combining (1'), (2), and (3), using the recursion relationships, taking the logarithm of both sides, and finally using a Taylor approximation, yields: where WO is the competitive wage rate with no OJT investments at some reference level of individual characteristics. Equation (4') describes how an individual's wages throughout the life-cycle are related to past work history (Al, = 0, 1,..., t), investment patterns (ki, T = 0, 1,. .., t). and other personal characteristics. The behavioral content of the model is encapsulated in pattern of the ki, reflecting the rational investment choices of individuals. Since this investment pattern cannot be directly observed, estimation of the model requires the imposition of some structure based upon theoretical considerations. Moreover, the empirical usefulness of the model rests upon the consistency of these investment patterns across individuals, since if "otherwise identical" individuals follow substantially different investment strategies that cannot be readily parameterized in terms of observable characteristics, the model is tautological and lacking of predictive power.
The focus of most empirical analyses of wage determination has been the specification of the underlying investment profiles and/or the stochastic structure of the model. The following section presents a number of generalizations of previous models and considers the identification and estimation of the structural investment parameters.
1.2. Empirical Implementation. The typical cross-sectional analysis simultaneously introduces several assumptions to translate the conceptual model into a form amenable to estimation. The ki are assumed to be some exact functional relationship of observed characteristics such as time out of school (i.e., ki=g[T]); work histories are assumed to be time-invariant (e.g., i_ 1); and, unobserved factors (qi) are assumed to be distributed independently of the observed determinants of wages.3 With these assumptions, knowledge of the current value of z (the time out of school or "potential experience9' of an individual) is sufficient to characterize past human capital accumulation, and, when augmented with data about other observable characteristics of individuals (X), the estimation of the wage relationship in Equation 4' is straightforward.
Given a particular specification of the optimal investment profile, there remain three major difficulties with these cross-sectional analyses. First, if work activity (Xi) differs over time for individuals, considerable error will be introduced in the estimation of an individual's human capital stock, even when investment plans are adequately characterized. Even white males, historically the demographic group with the most stable employment, show considerable variation in work activity. Second, there are conceptual and empirical reasons to believe that the unobserved determinants of wages may, in fact, be correlated with the observed determinants (cf. Griliches [1977] , Hausman [1978] ). Finally, even with these assumptions, the rate of return and the parameters of the investment schedule generally are not separately identified. This section develops an integrated solution to these major problems, based in part upon the additional information found in panel data on individuals.
Panel data provide direct observations of the Xi's, at least for some period of an individual's career, but the estimation of the accumulated human capital stock still requires a priori specification of desired, or optimal, investment rates. The pattern of the ki's, the individual's investment program, presumably incorporates the length of expected working life, the rate of return on investments, the costs of investment, the expected pattern of labor force participation and employment, and the pattern of depreciation of capital. Nevertheless, theory yields few specific insights into the form of investment profiles other than their eventual decline (owing to shortened "pay back" periods and increasing opportunity costs of investments). This analysis begins by adopting a generalization of the "standard" (Mincer) formulation of investment profiles. This is subsequently modified by explicitly incorporating individual specific measures of labor force attachment; ultimately a wide variety of alternative maintained hypotheses about the systematic determinants and functional form of the individual's optimal investment plan are analyzed.
For expositional purposes, we concentrate upon investment schedules described by investment ratios (ki) that decline linearly with the individual's potential 3 Note that i 1 is stronger than actually needed for empirical implementation. If, for example, the Ar's differ across individuals but are constant over each individual's lifetime (i.e., =2i), cross-sectional information about individuals' potential experience and actual labor market experience is sufficient to characterize total investments (cf. see Hanushek and Quigley [1978] ). The analysis of part-week work of women by Jones and Long [1979] is essentially an adaptation of the "lambda constant" model. Such a formulation is neither the only nor even the most plausible specification of individual investment behavior. Yet, because of its convenience and usefulness in empirical analysis, particularly when direct measurement of work activity is unavailable, this implied investment pattern has dominated statistical estimation of earnings and wage models. Further, while seldom made explicit, it is central to many comparisons of black-white or male-female earnings differences. Subsequent discussion will focus both on the interpretation and on various modifications of this specification, but it is useful to indicate some of the key assumptions at this point. Individuals are presumed to make optimal investment plans that are independent of the specific occupation, industry, or firm of their employment, and the plan is not readjusted based upon realized employment records.5 This formulation thus contains a number of obvious assumptions about individual foresight, the functioning of capital markets, and the availability of training opportunities.
The actual pattern of capital accumulation is dependent upon both the planned work-training division (ki) and the realized work (Xi) in each period; therefore, annual investment will not be linear -indeed it will not necessarily be monotonically decreasing-when employment varies over time. Nevertheless, the implied life-cycle pattern of investment plans in Equation 5, since it does not directly incorporate individual variations in expected labor force activity, is probably least plausible for individuals who have in the past or might expect in the future to move in and out of the labor force -for example, some women and minorities. At this point, no attempt is made to derive independently any new specification of investment behavior. Instead, the thrust of this effort is to I Also for expositional convenience, the investment profile is specified as deterministic. However, the analytical development is consistent with a more general random coefficients specification:
( concentrate upon the direct interaction between investment and employment experiences while exploiting the relatively parsimonious investment characterization common to most previous empirical analyses.
The other major consideration in the empirical implementation of the model is the precise specification of the stochastic structure of wages. Virtually all past wage investigations can be cast in terms of a simple error components structure, where it is the sum of a systematic, time invariant component (i) and a pure white noise term (4t) such that: E(wi, oi) -0 for i #j; E( ) = 0 for all i, t; and, E(i, p)=O for all i#j and p#t. In general, no additional distributional assumptions are made about the 0, but the dt are assumed to be drawn independently of the observed variables.
Most past attention has been directed at the systematic, individual differences (wi) -generally labelled "ability." As is well recognized, the parameter estimates for the wage relationships will be biased and inconsistent when ability differences (whether reflecting physical, mental, motivational or informational differences) are related to the measured determinants of wages.
The common thrust of this past research has been the introduction, either explicitly or implicitly, of assumptions about the omitted or unobserved abilities, so that any correlations with the included exogenous variables could be presumed small. In cross-sections, where disentangling the components of the it is not possible, direct measures of ability (generally cognitive test measures) have been introduced directly (e.g., Hause [1972] Equation 6 is a straightforward generalization of standard earnings generating functions such that, when Ai= 1, it reduces to the familiar cross-sectional wage relationship in terms of t and t2. In this form, however, the problems noted at the beginning of this section can be explicitly considered. To begin with, it is unlikely that the composite error term (wi -rvi + Xi) is independent of the observed variables (see Hausman [1978] ). Further, the biases in the estimation will be an increasing function of the variance of work activity. Finally, the relevant human capital parameters (r, Yo, and vj) are not identified in the standard crosssectional model. With Ai 1, the two parameters of t and t2 are nonlinear functions of the three structural parameters, and in general no solution is possible.
(One approach to identification is to set the return to OJT equal to the return to years of schooling, but such an assumption is clearly questionable). The advantages of panel data are also clear from Equation 6. First, the fixed error component for any individual (i.e., w -rvi) can be dealt with in estimation since it enters as a constant into individual wages observed at two or more different times. Second, if Ai varies across individuals or time and can be directly observed, experience accumulation can be distinguished from simple aging, and the underlying human capital parameters can be identified and separately estimated. However, to use panel data the specification must be amended to incorporate the effects of intertemporal differences in wages. Exogenous factors -such as the availability of capital and its organization, inflation, short run demand fluctuations, and so forth could lead to unequal wages for otherwise identical workers observed in different years. While our complete empirical analysis considers alternative specifications of time differences, each leads to qualitatively similar conclusions, and the results reported here simply normalize for annual inflation.7
Consider the growth in real wages (nominal wages deflated by price levels) between any two years (p and t) of an individual's working life. From Eq. (6) There are several alternative estimation forms that could be used; however, the alternatives do not have any more desirable statistical properties, are generally more difficult 7 In addition to the real wage specification, three alternative specifications were analyzed. First, exogenous shifts in nominal wages were parameterized as being proportional to changes both of price level and real GNP. Second, exogenous shifts were estimated to occur at a constant annual rate. Third, year specific exogenous changes were estimated with dummy variables. These alternative specifications yielded only minor and inconsequential differences in the results, although the latter two imply that identification of the investment parameters is conditional upon exogenous information about annual wage profile shifts. to estimate, and make it difficult to include individuals observed for less than the full sample period.8
Finally, this formulation can be contrasted with other wage analyses, which are generally interpreted as providing strong support for the OJT investment formulation. Such support has relied upon agreement with only a weak and partial set of the restrictions implied by the model --namely, in the standard crosssectional form, the concavity of wages in potential experience (i.e., the coefficient on linear potential experience is positive while that on squared potential experience is negative). We consider the empirical validity of the more specific restrictions implied by the model -restrictions on the pattern of wage growth as related to the pattern of experience accumulation and the career point of the individual. These implications can be considered only if the underlying parameters can be identified, distinguished from non-investment influences, and separately estimated.9 2. ESTIMATION RESULTS 2.1. Basic Models. Equation (7) Yet another alternative is the use of successive first differences of log wages (i.e., one year growth rates) as the basis for estimation. However, since adjoining growth rates have a common white noise term, a particular type of negative serial correlation is induced by this, and correction is difficult given conventionally available estimation packages. No explicit consideration is given to job changes which are viewed as a possible mechanism by which the returns to investment are obtained (as opposed to an exogenous event).12 Table 1 displays separate GLS estimates of Equation (7) by race and sex. Although allowed to vary freely in the estimation, the estimate of p (the intra-class correlation coefficient) is, in each case, numerically close to, and insignificantly different from, 0.5. From Equation (7), this implies that intertemporal variations in the effects of exogenous factors, such as ability, are unimportant and that the more general random coefficients investment model adds little. 13 The estimates suggest that changes to bad health status reduce wage growth in their year of occurrence by one percent for white males and eight percent for black males. Movement into the South reduces the wage growth of black women by seven percent and of white women by nine percent. For black males the estimate reaches 15 percent, while for white males relocation into the South appears to have no effect upon wage growth.
The parameters of the investment schedule and the rate of return on investments are presented in the bottom panel of Table 1 ; t ratios for the parameters yT, Tl, and r are estimated by a Taylor series expansion. In no case is the estimated rate of return significantly different from zero at the .05 level for a one-tailed test. For white males the point estimate of the real rate of return is a plausible 5.2 " In each year, "bad health" is coded as one for self-reported health limitations and zero otherwise. (This variable is unavailable for females). Residence is coded as one for workers in the 13 states of the Old Confederacy and zero otherwise. Thus +1 indicates movement into the South (or bad health status), 0 indicates no change, and -1 indicates movement from the South (or bad health).
12 As discussed below, if investment differs by occupation, industry, or job, the entire model would require substantial modification. 13 When there is serial correlation of the e's, the calculation of p will contain a covariance term, and its expected value will no longer be 0.5. Similarly, individual variance in the parameters of the investment schedule will induce serial correlation. percent, and the investment profile is quite flat; investment ratios decline by two percentage points per year, and there is positive net investment for 25 years. For black males the estimated real rate of return is very small, with investment ratios declining more sharply; however, the initial level of investment yo has the wrong sign. For females, the investment parameters are quite implausible. Point estimates of the investment parameters and the associated t ratios do vary somewhat with the specification of exogenous economic forces. However, none of the alternative estimates yields more plausible results for female workers.
Part of the divergence in results across groups could reflect interactions between investment profiles and schooling levels (coupled with differences in schooling Table 2 presents estimates of the same model for white workers stratified by sex and three schooling levels. The most striking finding is again the differences across the population groups. For white workers, the F-ratios (F=2.78 for males and F=2.68 for females) suggest heterogeneity " It may be anticipated that the capital investment patterns differ for demographic groups with identical work histories due to unobserved differences in expected future breaks in employment. In Equation 7, earnings growth is independent of stocks of human capital (consistent with the Blinder and Weiss [1976] formulation.) Weiss and Gronau [1981] have shown that, for this formulation, the rate of growth of earnings will be lower for those with expected future employment breaks. The differences between males and females or between whites and blacks in Table I are not consistent with this theoretical result. across the three schooling levels: 8 or fewer years of education; 9 through 12 years; and more than 12 years. This also holds for black workers (F=7.52 for males and F=1.86 for females). Except perhaps for males with nine to twelve years schooling and females with some college, the results are again implausible; the signs on the relevant human capital parameters are consistently incorrect according to the theoretical model. Only for the male high school group does one find the estimated rate of return significantly different from zero at the .05 level, but just barely so by a one-tailed test.
Another possible explanation of these results is that pooling observations over the different lengthed intervals (and, in particular, including the shorter time intervals) makes it difficult to detect the effects of changes in the humnan capital stock because of reduced signal to noise ratios. Further, the time periods of the observations are set somewhat arbitrarily at one year, even though the actual dynamics of wage adjustment may take place over longer periods or periods that do not correspond completely to the anniual survey.'5 These possibilities are considered by estimating the basic model separately for the one year through six year differences,'6 since both possible conditions would have less effect on the statistical results when observations refer to longer periods of time. Such strati fication yields no additional support for the underlying model. Specifically, there is no apparent improvement in results from those stratifications based on longer time intervals. Thus, it does not appear that the weak results simply reflect "data problems" inherent in the differencing of fixed time observations. 2.2. Some Extended Tests. Two other possible explanations for the results relate to the specification of the optimal investment patterns and to the pattern of labor supply. First, while the general investment model may be appropriate, the specific functional form of the profiles may not be. Second, while the focal point is wage determination, individuals also make some choices about the amount of time to spend working; this implies that labor market experience is endogenous and the coefficients may be biased. 17 A wide variety of maintained hypotheses about optimal investment plans were investigated. Because an individual's investment strategy may be related to the degree of commitment to the labor force (cf. Weiss and Gronau [1981] ), the parameters of the linear function (Yo and Yi) were allowed to vary with the individual's average, or permanent, labor force activity, and the desired investment profile was related to actual accumulated experience as opposed to potential experience. These variations seemed particularly reasonable for females where there is more variation in labor force attachment, although the specifications still rely upon observed data and therefore cannot account for any planned labor force withdrawal that hasn't yet occured. In addition, exponentially declining functions in potential experience, with and without depreciation, were considered. Further, while the linearly declining schedules were generally not constrained to positive values (thus leading to a net investment interpretation), estimation that constrained investment to be nonnegative was also conducted. The results from each of these formulations were qualitatively similar to those reported: there were wide variations across groups, but the relevant parameters often had incorrect signs or were implausible. 18 Clearly, however, the range of investment specifications that have been investigated remains limited. For example, all of the investment plans (incorporated in the pattern of the ki) call for monotonic declines throughout the worklife (except for some effects of updating based upon realized participation rates). This need not be the case, particularly for individuals planning a temporary withdrawal from the labor force -say to raise a family. Theoretical analyses, nonetheless, provide little guidance when labor force participation plans are unknown; even when known, precise predictions are available only with quite strong assumptions. It does seem that the samples of male workers or college educated workers would be less affected by such considerations of intermittant paticipation; yet the estimation results are no better for these stratifications. To the extent that one must alternatively consider different investment strategies for many different subgroups in the population, the appeal of the elegant and simple OJT model is considerably lessened.
The statistical complications might occur because work in any year may be affected by the wage obtained in that year and, importantly, might be related to the stochastic term in the wage equations (ci). In Equation (7), the work effort in the first period (24) is the only term that appears with the contemporaneous error. To investigate possible simultaneity, an instrument for 24 was formed, based upon future labor force experience, and used in each of the wage growth models; the results were unaffected by this instrumental procedure.
Compar-ison with Previous
Analyses. This estimation provides little support for the human capital investment model even though the investment model -tested elsewhere in a wide variety of forms -has been quite generally accepted. The conflict in evidence may, however, be more apparent than real.
This analysis has simultaneously made several modifications to the typical analysis of wage determination. It has generalized the "standard" investment models to incorporate the interaction between work behavior and on-the-job training. It has developed an estimation strategy that avoids the confounding effects of "ability" and other individual-specific unobservables. And, it has formulated an earnings determination model in which the relevant investment parameters are separately identified (without further assuming that the rates of return to schooling and on-the-job training are the same). This last difference -the identification and estimation of the investment parameters changes the nature of the tests of the model and appears to lead to the largest discrepancy between the evidence here and that developed elsewhere. Without identification of the investment parameters, the only "test" of the basic model has been the concavity of age-earnings profiles, an empirical regularity that is consistent with a wide variety of underlying explanations.
Some indication of the importance of these differences is obtained by comparing results to those of the standard "fulltime work" cross-sectional wage model using the same data set but relying upon undifferenced observations. (This formulation assumes Xi = 1 and reduces to a quadratic function of potential experience). In all but one of the 12 race/sex/schooling stratifications, estimates pass routine "tests" of the OJT model -i.e., log wages are found to be concave in potential experience.19 This ability to reproduce "standard'9 cross-sectional results offers further confirmation that the results here are not an artifact of sample peculiarities or measurement errors in the wage rates.
The wage formulation of Hanushek and Quigley [1978] , which incorporates observed experience accumulation, goes one step further by providing direct parameter estimates if labor force activity is constant over the worker's lifetime (i.e., X=Xi).
Again, using the same samples, the results are quite consistent with previous cross-sectional results in terms of explained variance, concavity of profiles, and so forth.20
But the investment theory has stronger implications for the relationsllip among aging, the accumulation of experience, on-the-job training investments, and the growth of earnings. Further, by concentrating upon wage growth -the appropriate focus of attention for investment returns-OJT effects can be separated from "ability" and other unobservables. In this growth formulation, however, the OJT model gets only weak support. The apparently strong support for the OJT model in more conventional formulations comes only because log wages are concave in potential experience aind in accumulated experience. Witlhout identification of the separate investment parameters, the "tests"' are simply very weak, amounting to certain regularities in the signs of composite parameters.
It should be stressed that only a few of the "dynamic" analyses of human capital and earnings relationships in the literature actually analyze the evolution of individual wages. Typically, earnings levels are related to cumulative measures of experiences or to measures of historical intervals of activities (e.g. Mincer and Polachek [1974, 1978] , Sandell and Shapiro [1978, 1980] , Jones and Long [1979] ). 19 In this, log wages were regressed upon an ability test measure, dummy variables indicating calendar year, school completion within aggregate category, and quadratic potential experience. All estimation employed a random components error structure, but estimation that ignores any individual specific differences yields the same qualitative conclusions. 20 Explained variance was approximately 25 percent lower for the potential experience formulation, indicating that actual experience measures contain valuable additional information. The models were again estimated with GLS assuming a random components error structure. Correspondingly, the error structures, if they have a dynamic component, are not consider-ed in relation to the evolution of investment activities (e.g., Lillard and Willis [1978] ). When earnings or wage growth is considered, it is frequently related to measures of the stock of experience or to interruptions without extracting the investment parameters (e.g., Mincer and Ofek [1982] ).
Only a few previous analyses have considered truly dynamic wage relationships (Lazear [1976 (Lazear [ , 1979 , Brown [1980] , Hausman [1978] ). However, none of these models is derived from the underlying investment behavior, making such an interpretation very difficult.
In virtually all previous estimation, the estimated experience coefficients have been interpreted as either the return to training or the rate of investment in training, ignoring the fact that the coefficient is actually a composite of both factors. Indeed, while we have stressed the difference between our results and those of previous analyses, the results are very consistent in terms of standard interpretations. For example, except for black males, the results in Table 1 indicate a concave relationship between wages and experience. It is only when an attempt is made to judge the magnitude and curvature of this relationship that the Support for the investment model withers.
CONCLUSIONS
On-the-job investments are quite commonly accepted as an important explanation for systematic variations in earnings over the life-cycle, but this acceptance has not come from detailed examinations of OJT activities themselves. Instead, it has come from the logically consistent conceptual framework based upon individual maximizing behavior, coupled with very indirect empirical support found in the concavity of age-earnings profiles. As developed in this paper, the more precise empirical implications of the OJT model involve the relationship between the wage growth patterns of individual workers and their work histories. The models presented isolate the labor market returns that are associated with on-the-job investment activities, while allowing in a very general manner for the influences of such concurrent explanatory factors as "ability," "motivation," quality of schooling, and differential labor force attachment.
The empirical analysis involves explicit estimation of investment profiles and the returns on investments for different race, sex, and schooling groupings. The investment specifications include the linear form due to Mincer as well as a wide variety of alternatives, including those with random individual differences, systematic differences related to individual labor force attachment, and nonlinear forms with and without depreciation. The estimation methodology incorporates the error componients structure dictated by the specification and considers the possibility of simultaneity between wages and work effort.
There are two basic ways to judge the results. First, does the underlying conceptual framework provide a reasonable characterization of the observed earnings differences across broad groupings of the labor force? Second, is the implied investment behavior plausible? Judged in either way, there is only modest support for the theory.
The major conclusion of this analysis is that the restrictions imposed on wage gorwth by the broad classes of OJT investment plans investigated are suspect. The empirical results are simply implausible for substantial portions of the work force. While there are scattered results that are more plausible, the estimated investment behavior is found to differ significantly by sex, race, and schooling group. To the extent that different models are required for finely categorized subgroups of the work force, the elegant and parsimonious model loses much of its appeal and usefulness.
This empirical analysis, of course, does not (and simply cannot) "disprove" the validity of the OJT investment model, and our analysis says nothing about other activities which can be characterized as human investment. Alternative explanations, based upon shortcomings of the empirical specifications, of the data, or of the methodology, could lead to other conclusions. For example, the assumed OJT investment behavior imposed might not be "correct," and better characterizations might indeed provide more support. Or, measurement errors might have a dominant influence.
On the other hand, a wide variety of investment specifications have been investigated. Importantly, each of the specifications involves only the characteristics of workers and their market experiences in the tradition of past human capital analyses. Interactions of desired investment with OJT opportunities, related to occupations, industries, and so forth, might be important in determining the equilibrium investment patterns of individuals (cf. Rosen [1972] or Polachek [1981] ). In such a case, the systematic components of such investments could not be characterized simply in terms of individual characteristics. Incorporating such ideas in the wage determination models would then require simultaneously modeling the choices of occupation or industry by individuals. Further, the stratification by time periods and the estimation of the error components does not suggest that measurement error biases or other data problems are the explanation of the results.
This analysis leads us to conclude that more attention should be devoted to non-investment models of life-cycle variations in earnings. Detailed consideration of alternatives is beyond the scope of this paper; however, three distinct possibilities seem worthy of investigation. First, workers could be paid the value of their marginal product, but the age-experience pattern of productivity might be governed by non-investment considerations. For example, relative cohort sizes coupled with experience substitutability in production (Welch [1979] ) may drive age-earnings profiles, or interactions with demands for trained individuals (see above) may set equilibrium wage profiles. Second, wages may not equal marginal productivity in the short run. For example, with either long-term employment contracts and income smoothing or employer-employee sharing of the costs and returns of specific training, the relationship of contemporaneous wages and general productivity would be broken (see, for example, Hall [1980] ). Finally, variations in wage growth across race or sex groups could reflect complex forms of wage discrimination. Nevertheless, the detailed life-cycle wage implications of these alternatives have yet to be developed fully.
The familiar quadratic age-earnings specification has proven to be a useful descriptive device. This analysis indicates, however, that attempts to impute added validity to this characterization by appealing to underlying structural investment models is unwarranted. Furthermore, interpreting the results from such analyses in structural terms --as is typical in earnings comparisons between blacks and whites (e.g., Chiswick [1974] or Lazear [1979] )-may be misleading. Such comparisons and projections require knowledge of the underlying structural relationships to distinguish purely compensating differences arising from individual choices from differences in rates of return or in other factors affecting wage determination. The preceeding analysis suggests that the commonly employed specifications do not accurately characterize the underlying behavioral relatiolships. Therefore, they can hardly provide a solid basis for the desired comparisons.
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